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Abstract
The paper uses a static Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of South Africa and
simulates various shocks to the price of electricity. We attempt di⁄erent closures to the model
and compare their respective e⁄ects on the Consumer Price Index. In a CGE model, this is
measuring the real appreciation of the exchange rate, or international trade competitiveness.
In general, we conclude that electricity prices per se does not signi￿cantly in￿ uence the real
exchange rate, regardless of which closure is used.
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1 Introduction
Few would deny the importance of electricity as an essential input to production and to economic
activity in general. Since changes in electricity prices impact every person in South Africa, it is
important to determine the e⁄ect on the real exchange rate in South Africa. Salvatore (2004)
de￿nes the real exchange rate as the nominal exchange rate multiplied by the foreign Consumer
Price Index (CPI) divided by the local CPI. In our model, both the nominal exchange rate and
foreign prices are exogenous (and therefore constant, unless shocks occur), so that movements in the
domestic CPI show exactly the inverse of the movements in the real exchange rate. The paper starts
with an overview of electricity prices in South Africa, and concludes with an empirical analysis using
a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model.
2 Overview of electricity prices
2.1 International comparisons
Relative to international electricity prices, electricity in South Africa is sold at the second cheapest
rates, beaten only by New Zealand (Doppegieter et al., 1999). This is shown by the fact that the cost
of electricity as a percentage of total cost to company is very low, in most cases less than 5 per cent,
while electricity￿ s contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is only approximately 3,5 per
cent. It is therefore not surprising that the demand for electricity is relatively insensitive to changes
￿The paper originated from a brief study for the National Electricity Regulator (NER) (later, the National Energy
Regulator of South Africa (NERSA)). The ￿ndings of the study showed that higher electricity prices caused very small
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1in price, as measured by the elasticity of demand. The implicit ￿nancial subsidy on electricity prices
is clearly shown in Table 1, which gives an international perspective on electric power prices. South
Africa￿ s US$0.01/kWh price on electricity for industry is matched by no other country and only
India (US$0.04/kWh) comes close to the retail prices of electricity for households of US$0.03/kWh
charged in South Africa. The average international price of electricity for industrial use in 2004
was $0.10/kWh for upper-income countries and $0.06/kWh for developing countries. For household
use, the average international price of electricity for upper-income countries was $0.14/kWh, and
$0.09/kWh for developing countries.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
2.2 Trends in electricity prices
One can clearly see from Table 2 the large di⁄erences in electricity prices among di⁄erent users in
South Africa. In 2004, Households (38.7 c/kWh) and Agriculture (30.8 c/kWh) paid the highest
rates for electricity, whereas Manufacturing and Mining continued to pay much lower prices (13.97
c/kWh and 15.36 c/kWh respectively) - less than half of what domestic users paid. One reason for
this is that the number of clients serviced in the Residential sector is much larger than the number
of clients serviced in the Manufacturing and Mining sectors, who consume about 65 per cent of total
electricity. This indicates that Manufacturing and Mining receive bulk sales at lower prices.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
In general, electricity prices in South Africa have declined in real terms since 1991, when Es-
kom announced its price compact with the conviction that cheap electricity was essential for rapid
economic growth (Van Horen, 1996). Under the price compact, Eskom undertook to decrease the
real price of electricity substantially. Table 3 shows that the real price of electricity for all sectors
declined by 11 per cent, whereas the real price for the industrial sector decreased by 25 per cent
over the period 1970 to 2005. Since 1990, the price of electricity for all sectors declined by 43 per
cent, while for Manufacturing, the price dropped by 53 per cent.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
The relatively low electricity prices could be attributed to a number of factors. Eskom enjoyed
relatively low production costs in terms of the value of its key inputs (coal), and hence a low marginal
cost of production ￿only operations (estimated to be between 4 c/kWh and 5c/kWh). This allowed
Eskom fairly high average pro￿t margins.
Figure 1 illustrates Eskom￿ s announced and e⁄ective price adjustments since 1995. The an-
nounced price increases are the increases approved by the National Energy Regulator of South
Africa (NERSA). The e⁄ective price increases illustrate the actual increase that occurred during a
year, as re￿ ected in Eskom￿ s balance sheet for the relevant year. The di⁄erence between announced
and e⁄ective increases is due to the di⁄erence between projected and actual sales, as well as struc-
tural changes to prices. In 1995, 2000, 2002 and 2006 the e⁄ective price increase experienced was
above the price increase granted.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Table 4 shows the percentage change in Eskom￿ s average prices per customer category after each
annual price adjustment during the period 1994 to 2002.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
As shown in Table 4, in nominal terms, prices in general had an upward trend. However, if
this is compared with the e⁄ective annual price increase, it is evident that these increases did not
necessarily follow a general upward trend, except for the last couple of years. As stated before, these
price changes originated from a fairly low base and, as such, represented marginal changes with a
fairly high level of volatility.
22.2.1 2.3 Electricity consumption
The sectoral distribution of electricity consumption in South Africa provides some insight into the
relative importance of each sector in terms of consumption. Figure 2 illustrates the relative con-
sumption for the following sectors: Residential, Commerce, Agriculture, Transport and Industry,
using the Department of Minerals and Energy price report data set.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
From Figure 2, it is evident that the bulk supply of electricity to municipalities (which include
Residential, Industrial and Commercial demand for electricity) comprises the largest component of
electricity consumption, followed by the Agriculture and Transport sectors. It is important to note
that these sales re￿ ect the direct sales of Eskom to these sectors.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Figure 3 shows that there is a relationship between electricity prices and the two most studied
price indices, namely the CPI and the Producer Price Index (PPI). However, the CGE model is not
well-suited to comment on the causality of these relationships, since it is a relative price model. The
important point to note from Figure 3 and Table 5 is that electricity prices have generally increased
by less than the in￿ ation rate in most time periods, while Eskom would have preferred that they
could increase prices to stay in sink with in￿ ation.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
To enable a more detailed analysis of the impact of a change in electricity prices on the real
exchange rate of South Africa, di⁄erent scenarios are analysed using a CGE model. Since a CGE
model takes into account all inter-industry adjustments, including a decline in demand, before it
arrives at an equilibrium price level, the results are di⁄erent from those of partial equilibrium models
that simply multiply a change in price with the CPI weight associated with electricity. Partial
analysis models usually assume that demand remains constant irrespective of changes in the level
of the price and is clearly inconsistent with economic theory. In such models, the e⁄ects of price
increases will be over-estimated.
3 Data and Model
The data used in the paper are the o¢ cial 1998 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of South Africa,
developed by Statistics SA (StatsSA, 2001). The SAM divides households into 12 income groups
and 4 ethnic groups, and distinguishes between 27 sectors. The elasticities used for the Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions in the model have been taken from De Wet (2003), who
estimated the elasticities using time-series data.
The model is the static CGE model of the Department of Economics at the University of Pretoria,
called UPGEM. It is similar to the ORANI-G-model of the Australian economy, and is written and
solved using GEMPACK, a ￿ exible software system for solving CGE models (Harrison and Pearson,
1996). In general, the model allows for limited substitution on the production side while it focuses
on substitution in consumption. It is a static model with an overall Leontief production structure
and CES sub-structures for (i) the choice between labour, capital and land; (ii) the choice between
the di⁄erent labour types in the model; and (iii) the choice between imported and domestic inputs
into the production process. Household demand is modelled as a linear expenditure system that
di⁄erentiates between necessities and luxury goods, while households￿choices between imported and
domestic goods are modelled using the CES structure.
3.1 Assumptions
We model both the short-run and long-run e⁄ects of an increase in the price of electricity. The
standard closures1 are described here, but in the scenarios that we model, we make slight adjustments
1We use the word ￿closure￿to indicate which variables in the model are exogenous.
3to the closures in our quest to understand the impact of electricity price increases. In the short-run,
the capital stock is assumed to be ￿xed, while the rate of return on capital is allowed to change.
The labour market is modelled in the typical ORANI way, which assumes ￿xed real wages in the
short-run, and an in￿nite supply of labour at the given real wage. This is a fairly realistic assumption
of the South African labour market with its large unemployment of unskilled labour. The supply
of land is also assumed inelastic. In the long-run, the real rate of return on capital is ￿xed, with
capital being allowed to adjust, while employment is ￿xed, with adjusting real wages.
With reference to the macroeconomic variables, it is assumed that aggregate investment, gov-
ernment consumption and inventories are exogenous, while consumption and the trade balance are
endogenous in the short-run. It di⁄ers slightly from the ORANI assumptions of ￿xed real house-
hold consumption in the short-run, because this speci￿cation allows us insight into the e⁄ect of the
suggested policies on South Africa￿ s consumption and competitiveness. In the long-run, we follow
the usual ORANI closure with C, I and G2 endogenous, and the Balance of Trade exogenous3. All
technological change variables and all tax rates are exogenous in the closure. Finally, the nominal
exchange rate is set to be the numeraire in each of the simulations.
The focus of the paper is the impact of electricity prices on the real exchange rate, as measured
by the CPI variable in our model. To shed light on this question, various shocks to the model are
implemented, while altering some key assumptions about employment and consumer behaviour.
4 The Scenarios
Eleven simulations are run to determine what the in￿ uence of the following variations in the as-
sumptions would be on the results:
1. the di⁄erence between being able to set the price of electricity and raising a tax on electricity;
2. the di⁄erence between a tax on households only, versus a tax on intermediate and ￿nal use of
electricity;
3. the di⁄erence between ￿xed real consumption and the standard closures;
4. the di⁄erence between ￿xed real wages and ￿xed nominal wages in the short-run; and
5. the e⁄ect of electricity price increases in the long-run.
In variation (i), we compare the situation where the government levies an additional tax of 10
per cent on the price of electricity with the one where the electricity industry increases its own
price by 10 per cent. A CGE model has endogenous prices, i.e., they are determined by the model
and could in general not be ￿set￿ by anyone. Usually prices can only be a⁄ected through some
exogenous shock to the model, or in other words, through a manual change to some variable that is
not endogenous. Therefore, to be able to set the price of electricity, we need to change the closure
of the model by making the price of electricity exogenous and another variable endogenous. The
only possible way to do this is to endogenise the amount of production taxes paid by electricity, or
some cost variable. The (neo-classical) model does not allow excess pro￿ts to any industry, so the
only way that they can actually do this is by either paying more taxes or experiencing higher costs.
Therefore, in principle, it does not matter who increases the price of electricity ￿the government or
the electricity industry ￿the e⁄ects will be similar.
In variation (ii), we isolate the e⁄ect of a tax on only household consumption of electricity. In
general, industries pay much less for electricity than households, and some industries would often
be exempted from price increases. Hence, it is necessary to isolate the e⁄ect of a price increase on
2From the well-known macroeconomic equation Y = C + G + I + X ￿M.
3No country should have continued trade de￿cits or surpluses in the long-run.
4households. In this scenario, we model the extreme case where all industries receive a special deal
from the electricity industry, while only households are targeted to pay more for electricity.
Variation (iii) is a comparison between the ORANI standard short-run closure and the closure
we use in the paper, described above. In ORANI, household consumption expenditure is held
￿xed in real terms in the short-run, alongside G and I. Only the trade balance is allowed to vary.
We compare two ways of modelling household behaviour. Do households try to keep their real
consumption levels constant in the short-run, or would they allow nominal consumption expenditure
to vary with nominal wage income? The former means that they keep total real spending on
consumption constant, while the latter means they react to the price increase in electricity by
altering the quantities consumed of all commodities, while also adjusting total expenditure. We
study the e⁄ects of the two scenarios and comment on the results below.
A key assumption of many CGE models for the short-run is ￿xed real wages. In variation (iv)
from the standard closure, we compare the situation where real wages are held ￿xed with the one
where nominal wages are held ￿xed. If something bad happens in the economy, such as a new tax,
and real wages are ￿xed, then ￿rms will be inclined to lay o⁄ workers. By keeping nominal wages
￿xed in the variation, we assume that ￿rms would rather lower real wages than lay o⁄workers. Firms
cannot continue to pay the same real wages and simultaneously employ the same number of workers
when their costs increase. They must reduce either real wages or employment, or a combination
thereof. By allowing real wages to change, we allow a price e⁄ect. If they are kept constant, we
expect to see a quantity (number of workers) e⁄ect.
The ￿nal ￿variation￿is actually the standard long-run closure. We are interested to know what
the e⁄ects of a rise in the electricity price would be in the longer run. In our modelling terms, we
allow the capital stocks of all industries in the economy to vary, while keeping employment constant.
In this way, we are able to compare the e⁄ects that labour and capital have on the economy in
general.
5 The Results
5.1 Increase in administered prices versus an increase in taxes
The highest increase in the real exchange rate was found when both the households and ￿rms are
paying more for electricity, and when we hold real household spending and real wages ￿xed at the
same time. The results of the ￿rst variation are presented in Table 6 for thirteen variables, of which
the CPI is the focus of the paper4. However, we are convinced that the in￿ uence of electricity prices
extends far beyond relative prices, and therefore also comment on the e⁄ects of electricity prices on
other variables. We list the relevant scenarios in the columns, and report on the macroeconomic
outcomes of signi￿cant variables in the rows.
In Table 6, zeros appear in the ￿rst three rows of all the short-run simulations, which indicates
the initial assumption about domestic absorption on the macroeconomic level. The exceptions are
the scenarios where nominal household spending is a function of wage income. The whole third last
row is also ￿lled with zeros, because import prices (PIMP) are assumed exogenous ￿South Africa
being a small open economy that cannot in￿ uence world prices.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
Comparing the simulations that start with ￿f0￿ to the ￿p1￿ s￿ (see the notes below Table 6),
provides interesting but intuitive results. Levying a tax of 10 per cent on electricity is like shifting
one of the curves in a two dimensional graph of supply and demand: the new equilibrium price of
electricity will be less than 10 per cent higher due to the elasticities of demand and supply (it turns
out to be 7 per cent higher). However, with the price-simulations, we force the new equilibrium
4In a CGE model with nominal exchange rate ￿xed, the CPI is measuring real appreciation, or international trade
competitiveness.
5price of electricity to be 10 per cent higher, despite the values of elasticities. Hence, we ￿nd from
Table 6 that the changes in CPI are larger in absolute value for all the price-simulations than for the
tax-simulations. The initial impacts on electricity prices are forced to be larger, and this e⁄ect works
through the price system and in￿ uences all the price indices in the economy (see PINV, PGOV, etc.,
in Table 6).
5.2 Increase in household consumption only versus an increase in inter-
mediate use as well
The second pair of scenarios to be compared concerns the taxpayers. The results are presented
in Table 7, and the e⁄ect on CPI depends not only on the subject of the taxpayer, but also on
the assumption about consumer behaviour. If real consumption is held ￿xed (zeros in row one of
Table 7), then a tax on both industries and households leads to a higher increase in CPI. However,
if nominal consumption follows nominal wage income, a tax on only households leads to a higher
increase in CPI.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
5.3 Fixed real household consumption versus nominal consumption as a
function of nominal wages
With all pairs of simulations, the CPI is higher when real consumption is forced to stay constant.
Real consumption (CONS) always decreases if it is endogenous, no matter who pays the taxes. So,
if we force real consumption to stay constant, it is higher than otherwise, with upward pressure on
prices. With real consumption ￿xed; we are forcing households to keep their total spending constant
in real terms. However, this does not mean they have to consume the same amount of electricity.
Their demand for electricity decreases, but the demand for other commodities increases, since other
commodities have become relatively cheaper than electricity. This increase in demand puts upward
pressure on the CPI, between 0.204 and 0.29 per cent (columns 7 and 8 in Table 7). However, if
￿rms also pay the tax, their costs increase and they will increase the prices of all commodities, which
will increase the CPI variable by between 0.24 and 0.34 per cent (columns 3 and 4).
With household consumption adjustable, it is clear from the ￿rst row in Table 7 that real con-
sumption decreases with a tax on electricity. It decreases more if industries also have to pay the
tax, because then the prices of all commodities will be inclined to rise. In fact, we see that the ￿rst
two columns on the left show a slight decrease in CPI, since consumer demand has fallen enough to
contract prices in the economy. If only households pay the tax, the higher price of electricity has
a positive e⁄ect on the CPI. Only the price of electricity increases and consumers therefore only
slightly decrease their total demand.
5.4 Fixed real wages versus ￿xed nominal wages
With all pairs of simulations, keeping the real wage ￿xed leads to larger movements in the CPI
(compare n-simulations with r-simulations in Table 8).
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
Fixed real wages imply that ￿rms have to increase nominal wages at the same rate as the CPI,
whenever they experience a cost increase. They will react to this by laying o⁄ workers. This is clear
from the last row in Table 8 in all the columns that show increases in CPI ￿employment decreases
more with real wages ￿xed than otherwise. Production of commodities in the short-run depends on
the amounts of capital, land and labour employed, as well as technology. Only labour can change
in the short-run, so GDP will also decrease more if real wages are ￿xed (see the fourth row in Table
8). A decrease in supply, given a certain demand, puts upward pressure on prices. Hence, with real
6wages ￿xed, labour is laid o⁄, which decreases supply and puts upward pressure on prices. The
reverse of the argument would be true when the CPI decreases; this is con￿rmed in Table 8 as well.
5.5 Long-run e⁄ects
The ￿nal set of simulations to be discussed is the e⁄ects of tax or price increases in the long-run.
The long-run is characterised by a ￿ exible capital stock, endogenous domestic demand, and an
exogenous balance of trade. The results of three simulations are presented in Table 9. The last
and third last rows contain zeros to indicate the assumptions of given world prices and exogenous
employment growth respectively. The three columns to the right (copied from Table 8) are the
short-run equivalent scenarios of the three long-run scenarios to the left of Table 9.
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE
Once again the results are interesting, and they con￿rm some of the short-run conclusions outlined
above. The highest increases in CPI would be experienced when a tax is levied on households only,
while an increase in the administered price would have a smaller e⁄ect than a tax on intermediate
and household consumption. In the majority of scenarios depicted in Table 9, we see increases in
CPI together with decreases in GDP. In a simple supply and demand diagram, this would only be
possible if supply shifts to the left and demand does not change enough to o⁄set the fall in supply
￿positive or negative.
In the long-run, real wages are ￿ exible, as well as household consumption, so that we only need
to explain three pairs of comparisons: (i) why we do have increases in CPI in the long-run, while
similar assumptions in the short-run lead to lower prices; (ii) why a tax on only households leads
to larger increases in CPI, and (ii) why using an administered price leads to lower increases in CPI
than a tax.
Firstly, the values for CPI are higher in the left three columns than for the similar short-run
situations on the right. Our assumptions about the macroeconomic variables on the demand side
mainly drive the results. In the short run, the changeable variables are consumption expenditure
and the trade balance, while in the long-run, the trade balance is ￿xed, and C, I and G are allowed to
change. Investment decreases as ￿rms demand less capital in the long-run. Government consumption
moves with household consumption by assumption (the percentage changes are the same in Table 9);
the movement is one that decreases, due to the rise in commodity prices. In both the short-run and
the long￿ run, GDP decreases due to a decrease in employment of labour. Total demand must follow,
and in the short-run, there is a large decrease in household consumption, the only component of
Gross National Product (GNP) that can change and which has an in￿ uence on the CPI. In the long-
run, all three components of GNP can change, so that we ￿nd much smaller decreases in demand
by households, and less downward pressure on CPI. In terms of our virtual graph of supply and
demand, household demand changes less in the long-run, and has a smaller o⁄setting e⁄ect on the
increase in prices that are experienced due to a fall in supply.
Secondly, the increase in CPI is higher in both the long- and short-run if only households are
taxed, given that household consumption and real wages are also ￿ exible. A tax on ￿rms increases
their costs and forces them to employ less labour than before. They employ less capital and decrease
production. From Table 9, it is clear that GDP decreases when ￿rms are included in the tax, while
it almost does not change when only households are taxed. This results in a large decrease in total
demand in the long-run, with downward pressure on prices. Moreover, if we look at the fourth row in
Table 9, we see that exports di⁄er markedly between the two scenarios. When ￿rms are included in
the tax on electricity, they increase the prices of their goods (actually the market does, since prices
are determined by marginal cost in the model), including the prices of exported goods. The result
is that export demand also falls to strengthen the demand e⁄ect. If only households pay more for
electricity, a decrease in demand leads to lower prices of some commodities, which stimulates export
demand to counteract the falling demand e⁄ect of the tax, and hence counteracts the decrease in
CPI as well.
7Thirdly, in both the long- and the short-run, CPI ends up lower if an administered price is used
to model the change in the price of electricity, than with a tax. If we compare the values of macro
demand quantities in the ￿rst four rows of Table 8 the administered price leads to larger decreases
in demand because the initial shock to electricity prices is larger. The same argument holds as in
the previous discussion, namely that the larger decrease in total demand leads to lower increases in
CPI than would be the case if the decrease in total demand had been smaller.
6 Conclusion
The main conclusions from the modelling exercises are:
￿ Electricity price increases have mostly negative e⁄ects on the economy. All industry production
decreases in the short-run (GDP declines as well), while many industries are also worse o⁄ in
the long-run.
￿ Poorer groups are a⁄ected in a worse manner than other groups; price increases should be
carefully chosen. The most e¢ cient policy is not necessarily the most equitable policy.
￿ While some industries enjoy the bene￿ts of exemptions, the consumers and industries who
are not exempt have to bear the costs of those exemptions, i.e., if some industries face lower
increases in prices, other industries and ￿nal consumers that face higher increases in prices
would obviously be worse o⁄. The latter industries would then face a greater negative e⁄ect,
than in instances where all industries pay the same price increase.
￿ When foreign consumers of electricity pay less than domestic consumers, there is cross-subsidisation
from the domestic consumers to the foreigners. In general, exports and the foreign markets
determine what the industry results would be if electricity prices increased. The e⁄ect on the
terms of trade and balance of payments is important ￿export-driven sectors are particularly
vulnerable to an electricity price hike.
￿ Some sectors, such as the Iron and Steel industry, are sensitive to a change in electricity prices.
Electricity makes up a large proportion of their input cost, with the result that any increase in
the price in￿ uences their cost signi￿cantly. Moreover, these industries are export-driven, thus
higher costs adversely a⁄ect their competitiveness in the world market.
￿ In the model, the e⁄ect on the CPI, and therefore on the real exchange rate is generally very
small. The South African Reserve Bank warned against in￿ ationary e⁄ects of higher electricity
prices, but we did not ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects in this regard.
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Table 1:  Retail electricity prices: International comparisons, 2004 

















Australia 0.36  0.06  Czech 
Republic 
0.06 0.09 
Belgium - -  Greece  0.06  0.11 
France 0.05  0.14  Hungary  0.09  0.13 
Germany 0.05  0.14  India  -  0.04 
Italy 0.15  0.20  Korea  0.05  0.07 
Japan 0.12  0.17  Mexico  0.06  0.10 
Netherlands -  0.22  Poland  0.06  0.10 
New Zealand  0.05  0.12  Slovak 
Republic 
0.08 0.12 
Spain 0.05  0.11  South Africa  0.01  0.03 
United 
Kingdom 
0.06 0.13  Taipei  0.05  0.07 
United States  0.05  0.08  Turkey  0.09  0.10 
Average 0.10  0.14  Average  0.06 0.09 




Table 2:  Overview of electricity prices & sales in South Africa, 1992-2004  
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Electricity consumption in GWh 
Manufacturing  42,122 43,681 43,014 47,481 55,073 61,070 72,663 70,796 70,665 74,778 83,581 78,796  101,556 
Mining  33,962 32,026 32,668 33,176 34,831 30,390 29,204 28,877 29,038 31,691 32,204 30,793 32,828 
Transport  4,629 4,017 4,389 4,297 4,274 4,563 4,639 4,429 5,411 5,562 6,246 5,565 6,302 
Agriculture  4,038 3,108 4,880 5,301 5,103 5,640 5,627 5,755 3,954 4,175 4,644 5,142 6,158 
Commerce  17,484 13,586 14,058 17,307 19,768 22,170 13,974 17,709 17,164 18,301 18,227 21,071 24,990 
Residential  24,253 21,542 22,115 24,369 29,552 30,722 30,163 29,511 28,680 34,623 30,418 34,074 36,231 
Total  126,488 117,960 121,124 131,931 148,601 154,555 156,270 157,077 154,912 169,130 175,320 175,441 208,065 
Eskom revenue in c.kWh 
Manufacturing  8.17  8.35  8.91  10.4  10.1  10.78 11.02 10.56 11.94 11.56 12.88 14.16 13.97 
Mining  8.79  9.52  10.11 10.62 11.02 11.66 12.22 12.61 12.91 13.35 14.14 15.07 15.36 
Transport  12.44  13.7  14.31 14.65 15.31 15.04  14.9  15.19 15.35 15.69 17.15 18.98 19.37 
Agriculture  17.14 19.84 21.13 21.99 23.39 24.66 26.42 26.58 28.88 26.85 26.47 29.14 30.83 
Commerce  15.57 16.46 17.43 18.65 19.49 20.23 18.85 22.27 22.64 17.95 19.51 20.62 21.88 
Residential  15.27 12.68 16.76 18.15 19.45 21.33 22.74 25.36  27.7  30.9  33.43 36.58  38.7 
Average  9.16  10.14 10.26 11.15  11.3  11.95 12.29 12.44 13.23 13.76 14.98 16.05 16.04 
Sources: DME (2006); DME (2005). 
 
10Table 3:  Real electricity prices in South Africa, 1970-2004/5 (2000=100) (c/kWh) 

















1970  14.36   14.1  1988  19.44  -3.1% 18.18 -4.9% 
1971  13.94  -3.0% 13.7 -2.9% 1989  18.6  -4.5% 17.44 -4.2% 
1972  13.8 -1.0%  13.57  -1.0% 1990  18.56  -0.2% 17.27 -1.0% 
1973  13.43 -2.8% 13.22 -2.6%  1991  17.31 -7.2% 15.9 -8.6% 
1974  12.62 -6.4% 13.17 -0.4%  1992  16.43  -5.4% 14.66 -8.5% 
1975  13.09 3.6% 13.42 1.9%  1993  15.58  -5.5% 13.65 -7.4% 
1976  15.32 14.6% 15.61 14.0%  1994  15.4  -1.2% 13.37 -2.1% 
1977  20.4  24.9% 20.66 24.4%  1995  15.4  0.0% 14.36 6.9% 
1978  21.28 4.1% 21.41 3.5%  1996  14.54 -5.9%  12.99  -10.5% 
1979  19.98 -6.5% 19.87 -7.8%  1997  14.04  -3.6% 12.77 -1.7% 
1980  18.65 -7.1% 18.74 -6.0%  1998  13.62  -3.1% 12.21 -4.6% 
1981  18.27 -2.1% 18.27 -2.6%  1999  13.11  -3.9% 11.13 -9.7% 
1982  19.58 6.7% 19.79 7.7%  2000  13.23  0.9% 11.94 6.8% 
1983  20.93 6.5% 21.05 6.0%  2001  13.02  -1.6% 10.94 -9.1% 
1984  19.99  -4.7% 20.1 -4.7% 2002  13.01 -0.1%  11.19 2.2% 
1985  19.77 -1.1% 19.77 -1.7%  2003  13.14 1.0% 11.6 3.5% 
1986  20.16 1.9% 20.36 2.9%  2004/05  12.96  -1.4% 11.28 -2.8% 
1987  20.04 -0.6% 19.07 -6.8%  Ave. 
over 
period 
16.37 -10.8%  15.62  -25.0% 
Source: DME (2005). 
 
 
Table 4:  Percentage change in Eskom average prices per customer category (nominal rand), 1994 to 
2002 











1995 4.0% 8.38 4.05 7.42 2.38 4.96 16.74 5.84 8.03
1996 4.0% 7.10 6.27 4.11 4.61 3.81 -2.87 3.38 1.38
1997 5.0% 9.73 5.52 4.15 -1.92 5.81 6.68 2.49 4.87
1998 5.0% 6.61 7.11 -6.79 -0.96 4.77 2.21 1.86 3.71
1999 4.5% 11.51 0.62 18.11 2.02 3.20 -4.16 1.73 1.20
2000 5.5% 9.24 8.64 1.70 1.03 2.37 13.05 3.17 6.35
2001 5.2% 11.54 -7.04 -20.66 2.40 3.42 -3.18 5.87 4.06






Note: *Effective increase refers to the actual increase that occurred in a year. 
11Table 5:  Comparison of the average Eskom price increase to consumer inflation, 1987-2007 
Year  Eskom average price increase (%)  Inflation rate (%) 
1987  12.00 16.20 
1988  10.00 12.90 
1989  10.00 14.50 
1990  14.00 14.30 
1991  8.00 15.60 
1992  9.00 13.70 
1993  8.00 9.90 
1994  7.00 8.80 
1995  4.00 8.70 
1996  4.00 7.30 
1997  5.00 8.60 
1998  5.00 6.90 
1999  4.50 5.20 
2000  5.50 5.40 
2001  5.20 5.70 
2002  6.20 9.20 
2003  8.43 5.80 
2004  2.50 1.40 
2005  4.10 3.42 




Source:  Eskom yearbook (various editions); StatsSA (various editions). 
 
Table 6:  Comparison between a tax on electricity and an increase in its administered price – 
percentage changes 
  f0wn f0wr f0xn  f0xr p1wn  p1wr p1xn p1xr 
CONS  -0.312  -0.312 0 0  -0.492  -0.504 0 0 
INV  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GOV  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EXP  -0.098 -0.096 -0.482 -0.818 -0.239 -0.169 -0.808  -1.26 
IMP  -0.186 -0.186 -0.035  -0.06 -0.291 -0.293 -0.051 -0.084 
GDP  -0.177 -0.177  -0.11 -0.186  -0.3  -0.29 -0.186 -0.289 
CPI  -0.001 -0.002  0.24  0.34 -0.032 -0.057  0.334  0.469 
PINV  -0.006  -0.006 0.059 0.167  -0.008  -0.028 0.091 0.238 
PGOV  0.004 0.002  0.03 0.319 0.002  -0.047 0.042  0.44 
PEXP  0.02 0.019 0.097 0.164 0.048 0.034 0.162 0.254 
PIMP  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PGDP  0.012 0.011 0.194 0.352  -0.029  -0.062 0.248 0.464 
EMPL  -0.31  -0.31 -0.208 -0.351  -0.52  -0.5 -0.344 -0.537 
Note: “f0”: industries and households pay a 10% tax on electricity; “p1”: prices are directly 
increased by 10%; “w”: nominal household spending is a function of wage income; “x”: 
real household spending is constant; “n”: nominal wages are held fixed; “r”: real wages 
are held fixed. 
 
 
12Table 7:  Comparison between a tax on households with a tax on both households and firms – 
percentage changes 
  f0wn f0wr f0xn f0xr f3wn f3wr f3xn f3xr 
CONS  -0.312  -0.312 0 0  -0.132  -0.097 0 0 
EXP  -0.098 -0.096 -0.482 -0.818  0.253  0.027  0.091 -0.196 
IMP  -0.186  -0.186  -0.035 -0.06  0 0.003 0.064 0.043 
GDP  -0.177 -0.177  -0.11 -0.186 -0.021 -0.055  0.008 -0.058 
CPI  -0.001  -0.002  0.24  0.34 0.103 0.185 0.204  0.29 
PINV  -0.006  -0.006 0.059 0.167  -0.028 0.038  -0.001  0.09 
PGOV  0.004 0.002  0.03 0.319  -0.012 0.148  -0.001 0.245 
PEXP  0.02 0.019 0.097 0.164  -0.051  -0.005  -0.018 0.039 
PGDP  0.012 0.011 0.194 0.352  0.05 0.157 0.126 0.261 
EMPL  -0.31  -0.31 -0.208 -0.351 -0.031 -0.098  0.012  -0.11 
Note: “f0”: industries and households pay a 10% tax on electricity; “f3”: only households pay a 10% 
tax on electricity; “w”: nominal household spending is a function of wage income; “x”: 
real household spending is constant; “n”:   nominal wages are held fixed; “r”: real 
wages are held fixed. 
 
 
Table 8:  A Comparison between fixed real and fixed nominal wages – percentage changes 
  f0wn f0wr f0xn  f0xr f3wn f3wr f3xn  f3xr p1wn  p1wr p1xn p1xr 
CONS -0.31 -0.31 0.00 0.00  -0.13  -0.10 0.00 0.00  -0.49  -0.50 0.00 0.00 
EXP  -0.10 -0.10 -0.48 -0.82  0.25  0.03  0.09 -0.20 -0.24 -0.17 -0.81 -1.26 
IMP  -0.19 -0.19 -0.04 -0.06  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.04 -0.29 -0.29 -0.05 -0.08 
GDP  -0.18 -0.18 -0.11 -0.19 -0.02 -0.06  0.01 -0.06 -0.30 -0.29 -0.19 -0.29 
CPI  -0.001  -0.002 0.24 0.34 0.10 0.19 0.20 0.29  -0.03  -0.06 0.33 0.47 
PINV  -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.17  -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.09  -0.01  -0.03 0.09 0.24 
PGOV 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.32  -0.01 0.15 0.00 0.25 0.00  -0.05 0.04 0.44 
PEXP  0.02 0.02 0.10 0.16  -0.05  -0.01  -0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.25 
PGDP  0.01 0.01 0.19 0.35 0.05 0.16 0.13 0.26  -0.03  -0.06 0.25 0.46 
EMPL  -0.31 -0.31 -0.21 -0.35 -0.03 -0.10  0.01 -0.11 -0.52 -0.50 -0.34 -0.54 
 
Note: “f0”: industries and households pay a 10% tax on electricity; “f3”: only households pay a 10% 
tax on electricity; “w”: nominal household spending is a function of wage income; “x”: 
real household spending is constant; “n”: nominal wages are held fixed; “r”: real wages 
are held fixed. 
 
 
13Table 9:   Long run effects 
  lrf0 lrf3 lrp1  f0wn  f3wn  p1wn 
CONS  -0.087 -0.012 -0.097 -0.312 -0.132 -0.492 
INV -0.365  -0.027  -0.4 0 0 0 
GOV  -0.087  -0.012  -0.097 0 0 0 
EXP  -0.369  0.051 -0.388 -0.098  0.253 -0.239 
IMP  -0.299  0.036 -0.311 -0.186  0 -0.291 
GDP  -0.155  -0.01 -0.171 -0.177 -0.021  -0.3 
CPI  0.049 0.193 0.031  -0.001 0.103  -0.032 
PINV  -0.14 -0.013 -0.157 -0.006 -0.028 -0.008 
PGOV  -0.545 0.005  -0.583 0.004  -0.012 0.002 
PEXP  0.074 -0.01 0.078  0.02  -0.051 0.048 
PIMP  0 0 0 0 0 0 
PGDP  -0.088 0.116  -0.132 0.012  0.05  -0.029 
EMPL  0 0 0  -0.31  -0.031  -0.52 
Note: “f0”: industries and households pay a 10% tax on electricity; “f3”: only households pay a 10% 
tax on electricity; “w”: nominal household spending is a function of wage income; “n”: 
nominal wages are held fixed; “r”: real wages are held fixed. 
 
 
14Figure 1:  Average announced and effective Eskom price increases 































Announced nominal price increase Effective price increase
 
Source: Eskom yearbook (various editions). 
Note: No data were available for the effective price increase in 2004. In 2005, the effective price 
increase was actually negative. 
 
 
















Source: DME (2006). 
 
15 
Figure 3:  CPI, PPI and average Eskom price increase 
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Source:  StatsSA and NERSA approvals (various editions). 
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